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Autism is a neurodevelopmental disorder characterized by repetitive patterns of behaviour, and impairments in both social reciprocal interaction, and verbal and non-verbal communication, all present from early childhood (American Psychiatric Association, 1994; World Health Organization, 1993). Autism is also characterized by atypical functioning within the domain of memory. However, despite its clear everyday importance for the healthy functioning of individuals (see for example, Conway, 2005), autobiographical memory in Autism has seldom been formally investigated. Autobiographical memory allows individuals to define themselves in relation to others and to their own personal life story. According to the Self-Memory-System (SMS) framework recently reviewed by Conway (2005), autobiographical memory is structured in a hierarchical organisation.  Lifetime periods (e.g., being a student at a university) can be used to access more specific autobiographical knowledge called general events (e.g., writing lab reports). These general events are then used as a cue to access event-specific knowledge (ESK), defined as sensory-perceptual episodic memories (e.g., arriving at university with your parents and being nervous).
Studies investigating AM in autism revealed that children and adults with autism  have difficulties in recalling events and facts from their personal life. For example, Bruck et al. (2007) investigated autobiographical memory in children with Autistic Spectrum Disorder (ASD) using a questionnaire in which children were asked to provide life facts (e.g., ‘What is your mother’s name?’) and narratives of life events (e.g., ‘What happened at your last birthday party?’). Results showed that, overall, children with ASD recalled fewer autobiographical memories and that these memories were characterized by a lack of detail. Moreover, compared to memories for recent events, memories for early-life events were very poor.  Results also showed that children with ASD had difficulties recalling personal factual knowledge. In a study involving only adults with Asperger syndrome (AS), Goddard, Howlin, Dritschel, and Patel (2006) showed a diminished ability for recalling episodic autobiographical memories in this population. Finally, a recent study by Crane & Goddard (2008) has highlighted the dissociation between personal factual knowledge and episodic memories. In their study, personal facts and episodic memories were assessed in a group of adults with autism and a matched comparison group, using an autobiographical memory interview (CAMI; Beckerian et al., 2001), an episodic memory narrative task, and an autobiographical fluency task (Dritschel et al., 1992). Findings from the fluency and episodic memory narrative tasks showed a personal episodic memory deficit in the ASD group, while personal semantic memory showed no overall group differences. These results suggest a dissociation between preserved personal factual knowledge and diminished episodic memories in ASD. 

Recent theoretical developments suggest that autobiographical memories can be associated with different states of consciousness. In particular, autonoetic consciousness, defined as the feeling of re-experiencing or reliving the past and mentally travelling back in subjective time (Tulving, 1985), is crucial in episodic memories (Conway et al., 1997). Patient studies and studies with older adults also show that difficulties in recalling episodic AM are associated with diminished autonoetic consciousness (Piolino et al., 2003). One aim of this study was thus to assess whether AS individuals’ difficulties in recalling episodic AM were characterized by a diminished autonoetic consciousness.

Previous studies have shown that memory functioning in high functioning autistic (HFA) individuals is characterized by specific impairments in long-term memory. For example, deficits were found on tasks such as free recall (Bowler, Gardiner, Grice, & Saavalainen, 2000; Bowler, Matthews, & Gardiner, 1997; Tager-Flusberg, 1991, but see Lopez & Leekam, 2003), while the memory performance is relatively undiminished on tasks such as recognition or cued-recall (Bowler et al., 1997; Minshew, Muenz, Goldstein, & Payton, 1992). Studies suggest that the memory deficits observed in this population could be supported by a lack of recollective experience, the subjective state or memory awareness that separates episodic ‘remembering’ from semantic ‘knowing’ (Tulving, 1985). This parallels theories in the aging literature, which are based on the finding that memory decline in aging tends to be characterised by a deficit in recollective experience (Bastin and Van der Linden, 2003; Perfect and Dasgupta, 1997; Perfect, Williams and Anderton-Brown, 1995; Souchay et al., 2007). Recollective experience, or remembering, occurs when a rememberer has a sense or feeling of the self in the past (according to Tulving’s (1985) view, ‘autonoetic consciousness’). Support for this hypothesis comes from studies using the Remember/Know procedure (e.g., Tulving, 1985) where participants report their subjective experience as either ‘remembering’ or ‘knowing and showing that individuals with HFA and AS reported fewer ‘Remember’ responses (Bowler, Gardiner, & Gaigg, 2007; Bowler, Gardiner, & Grice, 2000).Thus, on the basis that recollection is impaired in HFA, our hypothesis is to suggest that the difficulties individuals with AS have in recalling episodic autobiographical memories are characterized by a diminished autonoetic consciousness. Finally, neuropathological findings in autism also contribute to the idea that difficulties in autobiographical memory tasks might be due to a lack of recollection. Indeed, it is now well established that the frontal lobes and the medial-temporal lobes, brain regions both found to be underactive in autism (Baron-Cohen, 2008; Howard et al., 2000; Luna et al., 2002), are critical for recollective experience (see Yonelinas, 2002). Patient studies have revealed that damage to the hippocampus is linked to a lack of recollection (Bowles, Crupi et al. 2007), while studies involving frontal lobe patients also revealed that lesions to the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex lead to reductions in recollection (Janowsky et al., 1989; Levine et al., 1998; Schacter et al., 1996). Finally, recent neuroimaging studies on normal populations have confirmed the involvement of the frontal lobes and the hippocampus in recollection during encoding and retrieval (Davachi et al., 2003; Henson et al., 1999; see Yonelinas, 2002). 

As Conway (2005) stated, the integrity of autobiographical knowledge and the self is essential for normal functioning, as autobiographical memory is the knowledge base for the self.  Much research supports this idea of an interdependent relationship between self and autobiographical memory (Addis and Tippett, 2004; Wilson and Ross, 2003; Craik et al., 1999; Bluck and Levine, 1998).  Autobiographical impairments might have an impact on the nature of identity (e.g., Addis and Tippett, 2004), and potential differences in both recollective experience and perceptions of one’s self would probably have consequences for the understanding of others (see Boucher and Lewis, 1989). The SMS (Conway and Pleydell-Pearce, 2000) views the relationship between self and memory as a reciprocal one. Thus, while one’s current goals and self-images will directly influence access to autobiographical knowledge, this autobiographical knowledge also influences what the self can be. 

It is therefore possible that deficits in the ability to remember oneself in the past might have implications for the way one views oneself in the present, thus potentially affecting identity. However, recent evidence has also suggested that identity is not necessarily reliant on episodic memory processes. For example, Klein, Cosmides, and Costabile (2003) reported a case of Alzheimer’s disease in which the patient was able to report accurate self-knowledge, in spite of episodic impairments. However, the sense of self that the participant described was out-dated, in that it reflected characteristics that only applied in the past. This research contrasts with several case studies that have suggested a temporally appropriate and accurate sense of self can be retained in spite of episodic impairments (e.g., Evans et al., 1996; Klein, Loftus, & Kihlstrom, 1996; Klein, Cosmides, Costabile, & Mei, 2002; Rathbone, Moulin, & Conway, 2009; Tulving, 1993; Wilson & Wearing, 1995). As the debate on the relatedness of episodic memory and self-knowledge continues, Klein, Rozendal, and Cosmides (2002) conclude that there is something ‘special’ about self-knowledge, citing its dissociation from both episodic retrieval and non-autobiographical semantic memory. Klein et al., (2008) suggest that episodic and semantic self-knowledge can be thought of as functionally independent – thus, they are capable of operating individually though may be most efficient working in conjunction. Indeed, it is likely that for healthy functioning it is important to maintain a stable, coherent sense of self that persists through time by whatever means available (e.g., Conway, 2005). 

Some of the key findings concerning autobiographical retrieval in ASD are described above, but previous research has also suggested that aspects of self-knowledge, and processes involving the self, may be different in those with autism.  Klein et al. (2004) reported the case of RJ, a high functioning autistic individual, in an examination of knowledge of self and others’ personality traits. RJ’s semantic knowledge of others’ personalities was less specific and failed to differentiate between individuals, while his knowledge of his own traits was more accurate and clearly differentiated himself from others. These findings emphasise the social difficulties for those with autism, but also highlight the dissociation between learning knowledge about the self and learning knowledge about others. In an earlier study on autobiographical memory and autism, Klein, Chan, & Loftus (1999) reported that RJ possessed accurate personal factual knowledge despite having difficulties in recalling personal experiences.  The question of whether autistic individuals define their sense of self in a qualitatively different way to non-autistic individuals has been addressed by Lee and Hobson (1998) using the self-understanding interview (Damon and Hart, 1988). Results indicated that autistic participants had difficulties viewing themselves as part of a wider social group. Finally, several studies found that ASD individuals show a reduced self-reference effect (SRE) (Hare et al., 2007; Lombardo et al., 2007; Millward et al., 2000). The SRE refers to the robust finding that most people are better at retrieving information from memory that was encoded with reference to the self (Rogers, Kuiper, and Kirker, 1977). However, ASD individuals do not benefit from this effect. 






Eleven individuals with AS (9 male and 2 female; mean age = 34.1, SD = 11.1; range = 20 - 55) and fifteen comparison participants (4 male and 11 female; mean age = 32.7, SD = 9.5, range = 20-55) took part in this experiment (the groups did not differ significantly in terms of age, (t (24) = .34, p = .74). The adults with AS were recruited via local organisations and support groups for individuals with Autistic Spectrum Disorders within the Yorkshire region (UK). The inclusion criteria were an age of 18-65 years and a formal diagnosis of AS based on the DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Association, 2000) criteria from a psychiatrist or clinical psychologist who was an expert in this area. As autobiographical memory is closely linked to language development (Nelson and Fivush, 2004), language impairments could potentially lead to autobiographical memory difficulties. For this reason, we only included individuals with AS, who typically do not show any language delay (Baron-Cohen, 2008).

Prior to taking part in the study, all participants were screened for any neurological conditions and psychiatric disorders such as schizophrenia, obsessive-compulsive disorders, or severe depression. All AS participants (with the exception of one due to medical circumstances) completed the Autism Spectrum Quotient questionnaire (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). This measure has been demonstrated to be predictive of diagnosis in clinical settings when a threshold score of 26 is applied (Woodbury-Smith et al., 2005). All AS participants fell into the clinical range on the AQ [range=26-44].

The comparison participants were recruited via Further Education Institutes and were matched with the AS group on age and IQ (WASI; Wechsler, 1999): Verbal IQ (AS  = 109.55, SD = 11.26, comparison group = 108.47, SD = 10.99; t(24) =.25, p = .81); Performance IQ (AS = 113.18, SD = 10.40, comparison group = 109.33, SD = 10.06; t(24) =.95, p = .35); and Full scale IQ (AS = 112.64, SD = 8.76, comparison group = 110.68, SD = 8.94; t(24) =.56, p = .58). Ethical approval was gained from the Leeds University Institute of Psychological Sciences Ethics Committee. All participants gave their informed consent prior to the experimental procedure according to the declaration of Helsinki. 

2.2 Design and Procedure
Autobiographical memory task
The task used was similar to a test developed to investigate autobiographical memory and autonoetic consciousness in aging (Piolino et al., 2003). The participants were asked to provide autobiographical memories from three lifetime periods: 0-17 years of age (period A), the last 5 years excluding the last 12 months (period B), and recent life, which comprised the last 12 months of one’s life (period C). Periods A and B were assessed using four themes: an event or meeting linked with a person, an event linked to education or working life, a journey, and a family event. For period C, the participants were provided with five themes: an event that occurred last summer, an event from last Christmas or New Year’s Day, an event from last weekend, an event from two days ago, and finally an event from yesterday or today. The participants were given precise instructions to recall a ‘personal event, which occurred only once, at a particular place and date, and lasted several minutes or hours but lasted less than a day’ (Piolino et al., 2000, 2002).  The participants were also instructed that, for each cue provided, they would have a total of two minutes to provide as many details of the event as they could recall. 
Each AM event was scored using a four-point episodic scale (see Piolino et al., 2003; Baddeley and Wilson, 1986). A specific event that was situated in time and space, accompanied by sensory details, was given the score of four. An event that was specific, situated in time and space, but lacked sensory perceptual details was given three.  Any events that were repeated or extended, but were accompanied with details situating it in time and space, were given a score of two. An event was given a score of one if it was a generic memory: repeated or extended and lacking details situating the event in time and space. If the participants failed to recall any event or simply generated general information about the theme, a score of zero was given. Two different scores were allocated to each time period (Piolino et al., 2003). The first was an overall total score, which included both specific and generic information. For time periods A and B, the maximum total score was 16 (as there were four themes, each potentially scoring four points for episodic detail); for period C the maximum was 20 (as five themes were assessed). Secondly, a strictly episodic score was calculated, which included only memories that scored the maximum of four points (periods A and B) or 5 points (period C) for episodic detail. 

The Remember/Know Paradigm
Following participants’ recall of each individual memory generated on the Autobiographical memory task, participants were asked to give a Remember/ Know judgment (R/K paradigm; Tulving, 1985; Gardiner, 1988). Thus, if a participant felt that a memory was accompanied by conscious recollection, they would provide a remember response, but if they believed that the memory was recalled in the absence of such conscious recollection, a ‘know’ response was provided. Participants were also given the option to report a ‘guess’ (G) response if they felt uncertain about the status of conscious recollection (this inclusion was intended to maintain the accuracy of ‘know’ responses, based on the work of Mäntylä, 1993). The participants were provided with standardised Remember/Know/Guess instructions (Gardiner, 1988). 

For Remember (R) judgments, the participants were also asked to provide justification by stating details about the event, if these details were not already provided in the description of the memory in the autobiographical memory task (Piolino et al. 2003). Details used to ‘justify’ an R response (coded as ‘Justified Remember: JR) included any thoughts, feelings, or contextual details (location or time of day) related to the event. An independent rater also assessed the JR responses. 
The Twenty Statements Task
The Twenty Statements Task (TST; Kuhn & McPartland 1954) was administered to provide a measure of identity. This task benefits from being open-ended, allowing participants to define their sense of self using their own words, and is based on the idea that every person has numerous selves – and that these ‘self-images’ (Rathbone, Moulin, and Conway, 2008) can be collected through self report (e.g., Madson & Trafimow, 2001).  The task simply requires participants to respond to the question ‘Who am I?’ by writing down 20 self concepts that begin ‘I am…’ in a way that best defines their long-term identity (e.g., I am a mother; I am an extrovert; I am a thrill-seeker). 

Each identity statement was scored using the modified coding scale proposed by Rhee et al. (1995). The statements were coded into eight distinct categories of identity: traits, social identities, specific attributes, evaluative descriptions, physical descriptions, emotional states, peripheral information, and global descriptions.  Each category was further divided into separate subcategories (e.g., social identities could refer to gender, family information, occupation, ethnicity, or religion; see Rhee et al., 1995 for a more detailed account of the classes of subcategories), and finally each statement was labeled as either abstract (lacking specific details generally denoted by references to traits or emotional state, e.g., ‘I am kind’) or specific (reflecting the majority of subcategories, qualified by specific details, e.g., ‘I am someone who likes oysters’; ‘I am a student’). Following criteria outlined by Rhee et al., nonsense responses and repeated responses were not coded, and in cases where more than one meaning was provided, only the initial meaning was coded.

The scoring of the TST allowed for a total of three scores to be calculated (e.g., Addis and Tippett, 2004). These scores were the identity strength (calculated by the total number of ‘I am’ statements that were generated), the identity complexity (assessed by the number of categories and sub-categories sampled in participant responses e.g., social identities [religion, gender] physical descriptions [age, weight]), and finally the identity quality (obtained by recording the total number of abstract statements generated and calculating this as a proportion of the total number of statements given, e.g., a participant who gave 18 statements of which 9 were abstract would have a quality rating of 0.5). Finally, the TST was also coded to reflect the proportion of autonomous statements given by each participant. In keeping with previous studies (Rhee et al., 1995; Markus and Kitayama, 1991), all statements were coded as either autonomous or social. Autonomous identities are characterised as being stable over time and context, representing internalised feelings, beliefs, or abilities (e.g., ‘I am kind’). Conversely, social identities include reference to others, specific locations, or social context (e.g., I am from Farnham). As with identity quality, each participant was thus given a ‘proportion autonomous’ score of between 0 and 1.

3. Results
As the AS and comparison groups were not equally matched for gender, we controlled for gender as a covariate in all ANCOVAs reported. Controlling for gender did not affect any group differences, and gender itself was not a significant factor. The autobiographical memory test epochs are designed for those aged 23 and above. As two participants in the present study were aged 20, additional analysis was carried out excluding their data. The pattern of results when excluding these participants was identical to when they were included, thus the results presented are based on data from all 26 participants.

 Total Autobiographical Retrieval




Retrieval over lifetime periods
The pattern of autobiographical retrieval in AS participants compared to comparison participants is shown in Figure 1, demonstrating the mean proportion of total memories generated in each lifetime period (e.g., the number of memories generated as a proportion of the total possible for each lifetime period) and the mean proportion of strictly episodic memories generated, across the three lifetime periods. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 





Autobiographical memory and Recollective Experience

Following convention (e.g., Piolino et al., 2002), the distribution of remembered (R), known (K), and justified remembered (JR) memories across time periods in each group was analysed as proportions, thus for each time period, R = the proportion of Rs out of the total number of the participant’s memories, K = the proportion of Ks out of the total number of the participant’s memories, and JR = the proportion of JRs out of the total number of the participant’s R memories. The guess responses were not included in the analysis as too few were generated. The proportional results across all lifetime periods for the two groups are shown in Figure 2. 
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
The proportional results suggest that the AS group tended to give fewer R responses and more K responses than the comparison participants across all lifetime periods, particularly in period A: 0 to 17 years. In this early lifetime period, more than half of all AS participants’ memories were coded as K. The general picture that emerges shows a broad deficit in episodic remembering, particularly in the early memories, in those with AS. 

To analyse the group differences in recollective experience in more detail, a set of three 2 (group) x 3 (lifetime period) repeated measures ANCOVAs were carried out to assess the R, K, and JR responses, respectively. The analysis of the R responses revealed a significant effect of lifetime period (F[2,46] = 7.56, p = .001), a significant group x lifetime period interaction (F[2,46] = 5.74, p = .006), and a significant effect of group (F[1,23] = 13.14, p = .001). These findings indicate a clear recency effect for both groups, as well as an overall reduction in the proportion of R responses in the earliest lifetime periods in the AS group. The pair-wise comparisons revealed that there was a significant difference between all lifetime period pairs (p < .05, Bonferroni corrected). To analyse the interaction of the group x lifetime period, t-tests revealed that the AS participants produced a significantly lower proportion of R memories in lifetime periods A (t = -5.24, df = 24, p = .0001) and B (t = -3.17, df = 24, p = .004) compared to the comparison group whose R memories were more evenly distributed across the lifetime periods. As K and R are measured as two proportions that always add up to one, the same statistical results apply to the K responses. Thus, rephrased, these results indicate that the group difference reflects the tendency for AS participants to produce a significantly higher proportion of K memories for lifetime periods A and B. Finally, a 2 (group) x 3 (lifetime period) ANCOVA on proportional JR responses showed a significant effect of the lifetime period (F[2,46] = 8.72, p = .001) and a significant group x lifetime period interaction (F[2,46] = 10.78, p = .0001). Again, as with the R responses, the AS participants produced a significantly lower proportion of JR memories in the earliest lifetime period. The pair-wise comparisons again show differences between all levels of lifetime period (p < .0001, Bonferroni corrected). When these results are broken down statistically by group, the t-tests reveal that AS participants produced a significantly lower proportion of JR memories in the earliest lifetime period compared to the comparison participants (t = -4.98, df = 24, p = .0001), but a significantly higher proportion of JR memories in lifetime period C (t = 4.45, df = 24, p = .0001).  These findings indicate a clear recency effect for both groups, as well as an overall reduction in the proportion of R and JR responses in the earliest lifetime period in the AS group compared to the comparison participants. 


     			Autobiographical memory and Identity




The primary purpose of this investigation was to determine whether the episodic memory deficiency in AS individuals was associated with diminished autonoetic consciousness. Our results confirmed previous findings showing that adults with AS recall fewer memories but also fewer strictly episodic memories, showing that the memories recalled lacked specific details (e.g., Crane and Goddard, 2008). These results suggest that autobiographical memory in AS might be characterized by overgenerality. Overgenerality of AM (Williams and Broadbent, 1986) is defined as the tendency to recall repeated events (occurring more than one time) or extended events (lasting more than one day) rather than specific events (Williams et al., 1996).  Autobiographical memory is thought to characterise recollective experience when it is rich in episodic details and embodies the ‘mental time travel’ of autonoetic consciousness (Tulving 1985). Our results revealed that AS participants tented to rate their memories as known rather than remembered. Our findings thus corroborate previous research showing that ASD is characterised by a lack of recollective experience and extend the findings to AM (e.g., Bowler, Gardiner, & Gaigg, 2007; Bowler, Gardiner, & Grice, 2000; Crane & Godard, 2008; Goddard et al., 2007; Klein et al., 1999). 

Besides the fact that the present study showed that AS individuals recall fewer specific autobiographical memories, this study also revealed that AS participants expressed their identities in a more abstract manner. The results showed that the aspects of identity that were most different between AS and the comparison participants were the abstract/specific and autonomous/social natures of the identities generated. Specifically, AS participants generated more abstract (e.g., I am thoughtful), and fewer specific, and more autonomous, and fewer social, identities than the comparison participants. The coding system used to measure this index of identity is based on previous research (Rhee et al. 1995; Addis and Tippett, 2004) and denotes that the higher the proportion of abstract, mostly trait linked identities (e.g., I am hopeless), the higher the quality of the identity score. The present data suggests that AS participants express their identities using significantly more abstract trait-linked statements. However, another way of viewing these data is through the lens of social versus autonomous states. The AS group provided many more statements about themselves as isolated individuals (e.g., I am hard-working, I am hopeless), whereas in the comparison group, there were fewer of these statements and more associated with social categories (e.g., I am a husband, I am a student rep). This prevalence of more inward looking, self-focused statements is unsurprising, given that AS is characterised in part by a deficiency in social interaction (e.g., Lee & Hobson, 1998). 

Identity complexity and quality refer, respectively, to more specific details concerning the number of different categories and subcategories sampled and the specificity of the statements generated. In this respect, the differences in the styles of identity construction in AS (compared to the comparison group) appear to correspond with deficits in recollective experience. Recollective experience is characterised by a richness of specific details, thus the dearth of episodic memories and the generation of less specific and less complex identities might reflect a more general underlying process. We suggest that the differences in both memory and identity are perhaps best characterised by a broad lack of specificity. AS participants produced fewer specific episodic memories and also generated more abstract (thus, by definition, fewer specific) identity statements than the comparison participants. It is clear that the autonomous coded selves are also less specific in nature than ‘social’ coded selves; indeed, the criteria for social coding involves reference to specific locations and times or social context (Rhee et al., 1995). The specificity of autobiographical memories in emotional disorder was discussed in a recent review by Williams et al. (2007). The authors cite many studies linking depression with over-general memory (e.g., Kuyken & Dalgleish, 1995; Barnhofer et al. 2002; Park et al., 2002) and relate this idea back to Conway and Pleydell-Pearce’s (2000) Self-Memory System (SMS) framework. In retrieval tasks, depressed individuals are unable to reach the level of event-specific knowledge, and their search is truncated (dysfacilitation; Conway and Pleydell-Pearce; 2000) at the general event level.  Possibly, this inability to reach the level of event-specific knowledge in memory processes impacts on the level of specificity reached in the knowledge search required to generate identity statements in the TST.  Thus, a lack of specificity in AS might account for the differences in both identity construction and autonoetic consciousness. Correlational analyses to examine the associations between memory and identity measures in AS in the present study were considered, however the small sample size limits appropriate interpretation of their results. The correlations conducted did not indicate that the AS participants with lowest memory specificity also generated the least specific memories, and thus our data focused on between-group differences. However, the ANCOVAs reported show that the AS group is characterized by low memory specificity and low self specificity, compared to controls who generally gave more specific memories and more specific identity statements. It is suggested that future studies with larger groups would benefit from a correlational approach, enabling further investigation of the relationship between recollective experience and perceptions of identity in AS. 


Previous research has suggested that problems with recollection might be key to differences in the memories of those with AS (Bowler, Gardiner, & Gaigg, 2007; Bowler, Gardiner, & Grice, 2000), while the present study suggests that a broader lack of specificity might be responsible. It is important to emphasise that changes in memory in AS are associated with differences in how the self is perceived, but not a reduction in the actual quality of identity as defined by Addis and Tippett (2004) and Rhee et al. (1995). However, it is inaccurate to suggest that different ways of describing one’s sense of self can be better or worse (as implied by ‘quality’). This feeling is echoed by Baron-Cohen (2000) who suggests that HFA and AS individuals should not be viewed as disabled, and that using the term ‘different’ instead provides a fairer and more value-free description.

Several brain regions have been implicated in autobiographical remembering (see Buckner, Andrews-Hanna, & Schacter, 2008). For example, the prefrontal cortex (PFC) ventrolateral regions are involved in the retrieval of AM information (for review see Cabeza & St Jacques, 2007). Recollection of autobiographical memories also involves the mediotemporal lobes (MTL) and in particular the hippocampus, especially for emotional AM (Addis et al., 2004; 2007) or memories associated with visuospatial imagery (Cabeza et al., 2004). 

ASD is associated with morphological differences in brain structures and in brain function. For example, a common finding is that the amygdala and the hippocampus are of abnormal size in autism (e.g., Baron-Cohen, 2008; Brambilla et al., 2003). Moreover, when engaged in theory of mind tasks, several studies showed that a network of brain regions was consistently underactive in individuals with ASD. This network, called the social brain, involves brain regions very similar to the ones involved in AM tasks (see Baron-Cohen, 2008; Buckner et al., 2008). Our study shows that AM episodic recall is associated with a lack of recollection (i.e., fewer Remember responses). Several fMRI studies suggest that the recollective qualities of AMs are associated with increased hippocampal activation (Addis et al., 2004; Piefke et al., 2003). Thus, AS participants’ difficulties in retrieving specific episodic memories could be related to a lack of activation in the hippocampus. It is suggested that future research examine the mechanisms that might underlie the lack of specificity in episodic retrieval of individuals with AS. For example, there might be an encoding deficit, resulting from decreased activation in the hippocampus and amygdala (e.g. Howard et al., 2000; Luna et al., 2002). Results could also be accounted for by a retrieval deficit, whereby the memories are successfully encoded but are inaccessible. It is arguable that AS participants tend towards gist-based retrieval, and future work could examine whether experimental manipulation of retrieval orientation (e.g. gist-based or detail-based) affects the level of episodic information in the autobiographical memories of individuals with AS, as has been demonstrated in a normal population (see Rudoy, Weintraub & Paller, 2009).
The review of literature suggests that AS individuals have an impairment of episodic but not semantic AM. This is consistent with the results observed in other clinical populations such as temporal lobe epilepsy (Barr et al., 1990; Viskontas et al., 2000) or patients with temporal lobe damage (Gilboa et al., 2005). These results support a particularly prominent current account of autobiographical memory, Multiple Trace Theory (MTT; Nadel & Moscovitch, 1997), which proposes that semantic and episodic retrieval are dependent upon different brain structures. The theory states that episodic retrieval necessarily relies on activation within the MTL, whereas semantic memory develops independent of these brain regions. Steinvorth, Levine, and Corkin (2005) reported a study on retrograde amnesics with medial temporal lobe lesions, which supported the assumptions of the MTT. Their patients, HM and WR, had functioning semantic memory, but experienced severe impairments in episodic autobiographical retrieval. It was suggested that the preservation of semantic ability might reflect the independence of this function from the damaged MTL regions, in contrast to episodic function. Further, authors suggested that the semantic memories retained by the amnesic patients mapped onto Conway’s (2005) model of levels of autobiographical knowledge, with the semantic level of lifetime periods and general events preserved, whereas episodic recollection of specific events was impaired (Steinvorth et al., 2005). 
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Figure 2: Distribution of the proportion of R (upper panel), K (middle panel), and JR (lower panel) memories across lifetime period by group (error bars show standard deviation)
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